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Using plant-level data from Chile and the U.S. we show that investment spikes are highly pro-cyclical,
so much so that changes in the number of establishments undergoing investment spikes (the "extensive
margin") account for the bulk of variation in aggregate investment. The number of establishments
undergoing investment spikes also has independent predictive power for aggregate investment, even
controlling for past investment and sales. We re-calibrate the Thomas (2002) model (that includes
fixed costs of investing) so that it assigns a prominent role to extensive adjustment.  The recalibrated
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Economists are sharply divided over the aggregate significance of the heterogeneity of 
plant-level investment.  On the one hand, there is unanimous agreement that individual 
plants sometimes forgo investing at all and at other times have dramatic surges in 
investment.
1 Caballero (1999), in his survey for the Handbook of Macroeconomics, 
argues that accounting for this “lumpiness” is critical: “it turns out the changes in the 
degree of coordination of lumpy actions play an important role in shaping the dynamic 
behavior of aggregate investment.”  On the other hand, Thomas (2002) presents a model 
where this is not true: “in contrast to previous partial equilibrium analyses, [the] model 
results reveal that the aggregate effects of lumpy investment are negligible.  In general 
equilibrium, households’ preference for relatively smooth consumption profiles offsets 
changes in aggregate investment demand implied by the introduction of lumpy plant-
level investment.”  This “irrelevance result” inspired Prescott (2003) to argue “partial 
equilibrium reasoning to an inherently general equilibrium question cannot be trusted.”   
 
In this paper, we make three contributions to this debate. First, we introduce several new 
facts about surges in investment (that we call spikes).  In particular, we show that for both 
U.S. and Chilean plants, most of the variation in the total investment rate is due to 
variation in investment of firms undergoing spikes.  Moreover, this approximation 
derives its explanatory power from changes in the number of firms making large 
investments (the “extensive margin”), and not changes in the average size of the spikes 
(the “intensive margin”). We also find that information on prevalence of spikes in one 
year has predictive power for forecasting aggregate investment (even controlling for the 
past level of investment or sales): years with relatively more spikes are followed by years 
with relatively less investment.   
 
We then try to construct a model that not only generates spikes on average, but also 
variation in spikes over the business cycle.  To do this we start with the Thomas (2002) 
model, which is a tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that 
naturally yields lumpy investment. The heterogeneity in this model derives from variation 
in the fixed costs that firms must pay in order to invest.  We find that the exact model, as 
originally calibrated, has trouble fitting the facts about cyclical patterns in lumpiness. But 
by changing the calibration we can match better these facts. 
 
While we make several changes, the critical one is to alter the distribution of fixed costs 
that firms face.  In order for the extensive margin to matter, this distribution must have 
the property that many firms face roughly the same sized fixed cost in deciding whether 
to invest.  When the distribution has this type of compression, it becomes possible for a 
shock to move many firms across the threshold from not investing to investing. 
Conversely, if the distribution exhibits little compression, then firms become much less 
likely to synchronize their decisions and the extensive margin matters less. Importantly, 
even if part of the distribution is “compressed” there can still be substantial heterogeneity 
in the overall distribution and hence in the level of fixed costs that firms pay to adjust.   
                                                 
1 See among others Becker et al. (2006), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Cooper, Haltiwanger 
and Power (2000), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Doms and Dunne (1998).   3
 
The third contribution is to explore the aggregate response of investment to various 
shocks when extensive adjustment is important.  The Thomas model, as originally 
calibrated, implies that the fixed costs which generate spikes are essentially “irrelevant” 
for aggregate dynamics.  In particular, the aggregate dynamics (summarized for example 
by the impulse response of investment to a productivity shock) are the same as the 
standard real business cycle (RBC) model, which has no adjustment costs of any kind.  In 
our calibration, the qualitative response of investment to a productivity shock is 
somewhat different from the standard RBC model.  More importantly, we find that the 
original Thomas model and the RBC model also exhibit virtually identical response when 
the distribution of firms capital levels move away from the steady-state distribution (for 
instance, as might occur if a temporary tax change leads firms to accelerate investment 
spending).  In contrast, under our calibration, aggregate investment behaves differently 
than it would in the RBC model. Hence for this kind of shock the fixed cost seems to 
matter substantially.  
 
We conclude, therefore, that although general equilibrium attenuates the differences 
between the fixed cost model and the RBC model, it does not eliminate these differences. 
In other words, the irrelevance result is not a generic finding that comes from the general 
equilibrium, but rather a result that depends on the details of how the model is calibrated, 
especially regarding the production side.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections.  The first documents the 
aforementioned empirical regularities. Next we review the Thomas model and explain 
our calibration. We then explore the predictions of the re-calibrated model regarding the 
sensitivity to various disturbances.  We close with a brief summary.   
 
 
2. Empirical Evidence on Lumpiness over the Business Cycle  
 
To analyze lumpiness we study two establishment-level data sets covering manufacturing 
plants in Chile and the U.S. Capital stocks are constructed through a perpetual inventory 
method; importantly, we do not have access to the underlying micro data for the U.S. 
Census, but instead have tabulations that group plants according to their current 
investment rates. A brief description of the data construction is given in Appendix 1.  We 
start by reviewing three measurement issues before reporting our main results.  
 
The first issue is how to handle very small rates of investment, for example where 
investment is not exactly zero, but less than one or two percent of capital.  If fixed costs 
of investing are present, then we would expect to find few cases of this sort.  Yet, it 
appears empirically many plants report making these tiny investments.  We suspect that 
these cases represent some sort of maintenance or replacement investment (for which the 
fixed cost presumably does not apply).  So in what follows, we will typically aggregate 
the plants with near zero investment with those that report exactly zero investment.   
   4
On the other side, there is no clear definition of what constitutes an investment spike.  
The papers by Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005), 
and Becker et al (2006) all define spikes to be cases where investment relative to the 
beginning of period capital is greater than 20 percent.  To maintain comparability with 
these papers we use this threshold as a primary definition.  But the results for the case 
where we set the threshold to be 35 percent are very similar.  
 
The last conceptual issue that arises relates to aggregation.  To summarize the distribution 
of firms or establishments we must take a stand on whether each observation will be 
equally weighted or weighed by some other characteristic such as the plant’s capital.  We 
see equal-weighting as problematic (or at least inferior to capital-weighting) for several 
reasons.   
 
First, at a sufficiently fine level of aggregation every decision is lumpy; no one disputes 
that integer constraints and the like are relevant for truly tiny firms.
2  Conversely for the 
entire economy there are never any zeros and spikes are rare.  So as firm sizes vary, so 
will all measures of lumpiness.  This means that as the size distribution of firms in a 
sample changes, either because of changes in the underlying population or because of 
changes in the sample coverage, the statistics on zeros and spikes will change.  We would 
like our measurement to reflect more than just the mechanical effects that derive from the 
composition of the sample.    
 
Conversely, one way to partially offset the attenuation of the zeros and spikes that results 
from aggregation is to weight the data based on firm size.  Loosely speaking by giving 
firms with large capital stocks more weight when they report a zero or a spike we make 
up for the zeros or spikes that might be occurring within some of these organizations that 
are otherwise obscured.  As a bonus, a capital-weighted average of investment rates 
delivers a measure that equals the aggregate investment in the sample divided by the total 
capital in the sample.   
 
A final consideration comes from our specific interest in the general equilibrium effects 
of lumpiness.   Intuitively we expect general equilibrium effects that operate through 
prices to depend on aggregate indicators of lumpiness.  This suggests another potential 
reason that actions of larger firms (or establishments) are more important than smaller 
firms.  For all these reasons we will emphasize our findings that pertain to the capital-
weighted data.  
  
Figures 1 and 2 show the effects of varying the definitions of spikes and zeros, and of 
changing the aggregation schemes.  In each figure we report four panels; the two panels 
on the left show the time series patterns for the prevalence of zero (dashed lines) and near 
zero investment (defined to include establishments with I/K less than two percent). The 
bottom panel shows the data when the observations are aggregated according to the 
capital stock for each establishment, while the top panel treats all plants identically.  The 
right hand panels graph spikes, with the solid lines showing the percentages based on I/K 
                                                 
2 The model that we introduce below, like most models, abstracts from differences in size.  So even if we 
wanted to account for this effect it would be difficult.     5
greater than 20 percent and the dashed lines showing the 35 percent spikes; again the top 
and bottom differ based on the weighing scheme.  Figure 1 gives the results for the U.S. 
data, while Figure 2 shows the data for our Chilean sample.   
 
For both the U.S. and Chilean samples it is clear that many establishments are not 
investing in any given year, whereas at the same time there are other establishments 
where investment is spiking. The full distribution of the investment rates for each sample 
is shown in Table 1.  Fuentes, Gilchrist and Rysman (2006) stress the fact that emerging 
markets such as Chile tend to have more plants that are not investing than in developed 
economies such as the U.S. Comparing the dashed lines in the upper left panel in each 
figure shows that the (unweighted) percentage of establishments with exactly zero 
investment is two to three times higher in the Chilean sample.   
 
The figures also show that the level of zeros is sensitive to the weighting schemes used.  
As would be expected, fewer large firms report literally zero investment, so the reported 
percentages of zeros drops precipitously in the capital-weighted figures compared to the 
equally-weighted figures. The capital weighting makes less of a difference for level 
estimates for the near zeros and even less difference for the spikes.
3  For the rest of this 
section, we concentrate on capital weighted series.   
 
The figures show that regardless of the weighting scheme that is used, the 20 and 35 
percent thresholds for spikes are extremely highly correlated.  For example, the 
correlation between the capital weighted series for U.S. spikes of 20 percent and 35 
percent (the lower right panel in Figure 1) is 0.95.  For the remainder of the section, we 
concentrate on the 20 percent spikes.  
 
One final noteworthy feature of Figures 1 and 2 is that several of the lumpiness proxies 
show trends; below when we look at the aggregate investment rates we will also find 
trends for those series too.  These low frequency changes are outside of the scope of our 
investigation and in most of our analysis we will remove them by regressing the series on 
a linear time trend (although using a Hodrick-Prescott filter delivers very similar results 
for all of our findings).    
     
 The general facts that we have mentioned thus far about the prevalence of zeros and 
spikes have been documented in a number of other studies.  Some of these studies also 
describe the cyclicality of the lumpiness.  Figure 3 shows the (de-trended) capital 
weighted shares of establishments with either spikes or with near zeros, along with the 
(de-trended) aggregate investment rate for each sample; the aggregate rate is calculated 
by taking the capital weighted average of the establishment level rates and we denote this 
as Itot/K.  (The weighting scheme also means that Itot/K is the ratio of aggregate 
investment to aggregate capital in our sample.)   
 
                                                 
3 The pairwise correlations for the weighted and capital weighted series for Chile (US) are as follows: exact 
zeros = 0.82 (0.60), near zeros = 0.94 (0.23), 20 percent spikes = 0.92 (0.90), and 35 percent spikes = 0.90 
(0.87).      6
In each country, the spikes are strongly pro-cyclical and near-zeros are strongly counter-
cyclical. The correlation between the capital-weighted spikes and the aggregate 
investment rate (both detrended) is 0.87 for the US sample and 0.96 for the Chile sample; 
and the correlation between the capital-weighted near zeros and the aggregate investment 
rate (both detrended) is -0.94 for the U.S. sample and -0.56 for the Chilean sample. Thus, 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show all the standard characteristics of plant-level investment. 
   
In the remainder of this section we document several new facts regarding the connection 
between aggregate investment and investment spikes.  In Figure 4, we decompose the 
aggregate investment rate into two parts.  One part (shown by the lines with the circles) is 
the total investment done by those establishments where there is a spike (i.e. I/K > 20 
percent), divided by the total stock of capital for all the firms in the sample; we label this 
series I20/K.  The remainder of investment, that we dub I(0-20)/K, represents investment 
of plants with investment rates between 0 and 20 percent over total capital, and is shown 
in the line with inverted triangles.  
 
The relative levels of I20/K and Itot/K indicate that the spikes account for about half of 
total investment in each country; in other words, I20/Itot is about 0.5.  More importantly, 
the investment rate constructed for the spiking firms tracks the movements in the 
aggregate investment rate closely; the correlations between the de-trended series is 0.99 
for each sample. Clearly, the bulk of the variation in the aggregate Itot/K is accounted for 
by changes in I20/K. The share of variance of Itot/K accounted to by I20/K (as opposed 
to the residual I(0-20)/K)) is 97 percent for the U.S. sample and 86 percent for the Chile 
sample.
4 The converse of these observations is that there is little variation in total 
investment explained by the firms investing between zero and 20 percent.  Thus, for the 
purposes of modeling investment fluctuations it is critical to understand the timing of the 
investment spikes.
5   
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4 This is measured as Cov (I20/K,I/K) / Var (I/K). This calculation splits a covariance term and allocates its 
explanatory power equally between the two remaining terms.  If instead we use an exact decomposition that 
preserves all three terms, for the U.S. the numbers are: Var(I20/K) / Var(I/K) = 0.964, Var( I(0-20)/K)) / 
Var(I/K)= 0.024 and 2Cov(I20/K, I(0-20)/K) / Var(I/K) = 0.012. For Chile, these numbers are Var(I20/K) / 
Var(I/K) = 0.759, Var( I(0-20)/K)) / Var(I/K)= 0.036 and 2Cov(I20/K, I(0-20)/K) / Var(I/K) = 0.205.   
5 This fact is also present, to a lesser degree, in Figure 8 of Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (2000). The 
difference may be due to the fact that they use a balanced panel of rather large establishments. These 
authors also mention that spikes are procyclical but do not focus on this feature of the data.   7
In words, equation (1) simply says that the total investment done by the plants 
experiencing spikes can vary either because of a change in the investment per adjuster 
(IPA20, the intensive margin) or because of a change in the (capital-weighted) number of 
firms adjusting (ADJ20, the extensive margin).  This approach is analogous to the one 
proposed by Klenow and Kryvstov (2005) for studying price dynamics, where they 
decompose inflation into changes in the number of firms resetting their prices and 
changes in the average size of price changes for those firms resetting their price.  
 
Figure 5 shows a graph of Log(I20/K), along with Log(IPA20) and Log(ADJ20) (after 
each series has had a linear time trend removed) for the U.S. and Chilean samples.  The 
striking conclusion is that the extensive margin, ADJ20, drives variation in spikes.  
 
One way to conveniently summarize the information in the picture is to compute the 
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These shares by construction must sum to one. If the proportion of firms with spikes 
ADJ20 is constant, they would be zero and one, and if the average investment rate of 
firms with spikes is constant, they would be one and zero. For the U.S. sample 
ShareADJ20 is 0.87, while for the Chilean sample it is 0.925.
6  The dominant role of the 
extensive margin also appears when the threshold for identifying spikes is 35 percent 
instead of 20 percent. This fact also holds for different de-trending methods (e.g. the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, or just considering growth rates). 
 
Our last new fact about spikes is that they contain additional predictive content beyond 
just information that they convey about the past level of investment.  The spirit of many 
models of lumpiness (e.g. Caballero and Engel (1999)) is that the cross-sectional 
distribution of firms’ capital stock relative to the level that would prevail absent any 
adjustment costs should be an important determinant of aggregate investment. It is 
empirically difficult to construct this cross-sectional distribution, but there is a simple 
way to test for this possibility. We estimate regressions of the form: 
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6 Our decomposition splits a (small) covariance term equally between ShareADJ20 and ShareIPA20.   If 
instead we use an exact three way decomposition, the results for the U.S. (Chile) are as follows: 
Var(logADJ20)/Var(logI20/K)= 0.850 (0.903),   Var(logIPA20)/Var(logI20/K)= 0.114 (0.052) and 
Cov(logADJ20,logIPA20)/Var(logI20/K) = 0.036 (0.044).   8
So the novelty is that we add the (capital-weighted) share of adjusters to an otherwise 
standard accelerator type investment equation.
7   This type of accelerator style equation 
has repeatedly been shown to be an effective forecasting equation in horse-races of 
different specifications (Bernanke, Bohn and Reiss (1988) and Oliner, Rudebusch and 
Sichel (1995)).   
 
Table 2 shows estimates of equation (2).  The first six rows show the estimates for the 
U.S. data, while the last six rows show the estimates for the Chilean sample.  For the U.S. 
data the lagged dependent variable is always estimated to have a positive and highly 
significant coefficient.  The sales proxy is positively related to investment, but not always 
significant.  Conversely in the Chilean sample the sales variable is always estimated to 
have a positive and very significant effect on investment, but the lagged dependent 
variable does not systematically influence investment.   
 
Our main coefficients of interest are the ω’s that measure the effects of past spikes on 
current investment.  For the U.S. sample, the coefficients on both the first and second 
lags of ADJ20 are significant, whereas in the Chilean data, only the second lag is 
consistently significant.
8  Importantly, the estimated signs of the ω’s are all negative, 
suggesting that investment is depressed in the period after an investment surge.  This 
correlation is to be expected based on fixed costs models (and would be of the opposite 
sign if the past ADJ20 variable was standing in for productivity shocks or other factors 
that raise investment demand).  
 
Taken literally, the coefficients suggest that the echoes from the spikes have a 
quantitatively important effect on investment. For the U.S. sample (Chile) the standard 
deviation of the spike variable is 0.046 (0.093), compared to the standard deviation of the 
investment rate of 0.017 (0.054).  Taking the specifications where h=1, (shown in rows 5 
and 11), the estimates for the U.S. (Chile) sample imply that a one standard deviation 
increase in ADJ20 predicts an increase of the investment rate of 0.7 (0.57) of a standard 
deviation. 
 
Collectively, these new facts provide guidance about how to model lumpiness.   
Aggregate investment is largely driven by investment spikes; so a successful model 
should have the property that I20/Itot is substantial and that variations of I/K are 
accounted for by variation in I20/K.  Moreover, the spikes matter because of adjustment 
along the extensive margin, i.e. a change in the number of firms making large 
investments; these spikes are sufficiently important that they have independent predictive 
power for aggregate investment, even controlling for past investment and sales. We now 
attempt to construct a model that has these properties, and we concentrate especially on 
matching the fact that ShareADJ20 is large. 
 
3. A DSGE model with fixed costs of adjusting capital 
 
                                                 
7 For the U.S. sample, we have shipments data which correspond to sales for establishment data.   
8 When the spikes are measured with the 35 percent threshold then both lags one and two are significant in 
both samples.    9
We first review the Thomas model and then discuss how we calibrate it. 
 
3.1 A brief review of the Thomas model 
 
Thomas (2002) offers an elegant and compact model for analyzing the importance of 
fixed costs of adjusting capital on aggregate investment in a dynamic, stochastic general 
equilibrium framework.
9   
 
The economy has a fixed number of plants (normalized to be of measure one). In what 
follows, we refer to these as “plants” or “firms” interchangeably. Each plant has the 
production function: 
υ y=Ak n
ψ , where y is output, A is aggregate productivity (TFP), k is 
capital, and n is labor.  There are decreasing returns to scale so that  1 ψ υ +<  and there is 
no entry or exit. 
 
In each period, each plant has the opportunity to adjust its factor usage.  Labor can be 
freely varied, but adjusting capital can only be done if the firm pays a fixed cost.  The 
fixed cost,  , ξ  is a random variable that is independently and identically distributed across 
time and plants and comes from the cumulative distribution G.  This distribution has 
finite support and the maximum fixed cost is called B.  The firms that choose to pay the 
fixed cost, which we call “adjusters”, bear no marginal adjustment costs: they can buy or 
sell capital at price 1.  The fixed cost is measured in units of labor. Owing to the fixed 
cost, firms will not always adjust capital. 
 
Much of the model’s tractability derives from its inherent symmetry that leads all firms 
choosing to invest at a given point to pick the same new level of capital, k0,t+1;  this is 
because there is no heterogeneity except in the fixed cost drawn today and the current 
capital. So firms are distinguished by the time since their last investment.  Regardless of 
whether a firm invests, its capital depreciates at rate δ.  Therefore, 
 
0, 1 , , k( 1 k i tj t j t δ + =− ) +  when ij,t > 0 and otherwise   1, 1 , k( 1 k jt j t δ ++= −) , 
 
where kj,t is the capital of a plant of vintage j at time t, and ij,t is the investment of a plant 
of vintage j at time t, conditional on the plant deciding to pay the fixed cost. 
 
A firm that last adjusted capital j periods ago, henceforth a vintage j firm, will operate 
with capital kj (and labor nj).  This implies the following maximization problem for a 
plant:     
 
( ) 00 , 0
max ( 1 )
jt
jt jt
t t jt jt t jt jt t t i in t
mA k n w n i w
ψυ ξ ≠
≥
∑− − − E , 
 
subject to the capital accumulation laws above, where mt is the stochastic discount factor 
(the ratio of marginal utilities in period t to period 0), and wt is the real wage. 
                                                 
9 The setup is similar to the sticky price model of Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999).   10
 




tA t Az =Θ ,   t1 log z log tt z ρ ε − =+ ,  
2 is distributed independently  ( , ). t No ε σ  
 
The combination of the fixed depreciation rate and the finite upper bound on the fixed 
cost guarantees that all firms will eventually find it optimal to invest; in other words, this 
structure delivers a maximum vintage J by which time all firms will invest.  The solution 
to the problem involves finding that maximum vintage (J), along with the capital stock 
for each of the intervening vintages (kj), and the percentage of total firms in each vintage 
(θj).  
 
Thomas shows that firm’s investment decisions follow a cutoff rule: in any given vintage, 
and in any period, there is a threshold fixed cost, such that firms which draw a fixed cost 
below the threshold will invest and upgrade their capital, and firms which draw a fixed 
cost above the threshold will let the capital depreciate. We call αj the proportion of firms 
which are below the threshold (and so choose to adjust). In her simulations Thomas 
chooses a uniform distribution for the fixed costs, between 0 and B.  The level of fixed 
costs B is chosen to match two facts reported by Doms and Dunne (1998): i) in the 
average year, 8 percent of plants raise their real capital stocks by 30 percent or more; ii) 
these plants account for 25 percent of aggregate investment. 
 
The rest of the model is intentionally chosen to follow the real business cycle (RBC) 
literature.  So, for instance, Thomas adopts a utility function with indivisible labor of the 
form Ut=log tt cn ζ − .  Thus, aside from the fixed costs and the mild decreasing returns, 
the calibrated parameters, displayed in the second column of Table 3, are very standard.
10  
Indeed, when the upper bound of fixed costs, B, is set to 0, all firms adjust their capital 
each period, and equate their marginal product of capital and labor; in this case, there is a 
representative firm, and the model collapses to a standard RBC model with decreasing 
return to scale. 
 
This model is solved numerically by a standard log-linearization around the steady-state. 
First, one finds the optimal J, the maximum time-since-last-adjustment such that all firms 
want to invest. Second, one solves the system of non-linear equations that define the non-
stochastic steady-state. Finally, one computes the log-linear approximation itself. The 
log-linear method is advantageous here since the state space of the model is large: it 
includes the TFP shock, and the cross-sectional distribution of capital (the θj’s and the 
kj’s).
 11   
 
 
                                                 
10 Also, the model is calibrated to annual rather than quarterly data, because the plant-level evidence is 
based on annual surveys.  
11 For more details on the solution, we refer the reader to our separate technical appendix (available on 
http://people.bu.edu/fgourio).   11
3.2 Calibration of the Model 
 
In the first three rows of Table 4 we report several statistics comparing the prominence of 
spikes in both of our samples and in the baseline model. Given that Thomas chose B to 
match the Doms-Dunne facts on spikes, it is not surprising that the model also matches 
the prevalence of spikes in our sample.  In her original calibration of the model, however, 
spikes only account for about 62 percent of the total variance of investment and the 
extensive margin accounts for only 51 percent of the variance of spikes; in the data both 
these percentages are roughly 90 percent.    
 
In Appendix 2, we describe several exercises that show how varying different parameters 
one at a time change the extensive-intensive decomposition. We focus on three key 
parameters in these experiments: the maximum size of fixed costs, B, the distribution of 
fixed costs, G, and the curvature of the production function (ψ+υ).  Intuitively one 
expects these parameters to be critical since B and G govern the costs of adjusting capital 
and the curvature governs the benefits (by determining the loss in profits that result from 
having an inefficient plant size).   
 
The results in Appendix 2 suggest that the key determinant of this decomposition is the 
shape of the CDF. The intuition for this conclusion is that increasing the number of plants 
doing positive investment requires marginal plants to switch from inaction to action; this 
decision depends on the fixed costs for the indifferent plants. If marginally inactive plants 
face the same fixed cost as marginally active plants, increasing the number of plants 
investing is inexpensive. Hence, the marginal cost of changing the extensive margin 
depends on the shape of the CDF of fixed costs.  
 
Thomas, following Caballero and Engel (1999), chooses G to be uniform.  With this type 
of CDF (or any other that has a second derivative that is close to zero everywhere), 
increasing the number of plants investing requires activating plants that have substantial 
differences in the fixed costs they are facing.  Put differently, for any particular level of 
fixed costs, even a marginal change in the number of investing plants always involves 
firms with relatively different levels of fixed costs.  In this case it will be efficient to rely 
more on intensive adjustment. On the other hand, when the CDF is sufficiently 
“compressed”, i.e. so that many firms face nearly-identical fixed costs, the opposite result 
obtains: increasing the number of plants investing need not be very costly.  This means 
that the extensive margin can be important.   
 
The compressed CDF that is considered in most of the experiments that follow is 
displayed in Figure 6.  This particular CDF implies that the fixed costs for most firms 
bunch around B and B/2, but as we show below all of our results also obtain if there was 
bunching only around one level of fixed cost and there is considerable heterogeneity in 
the rest of the distribution.
12  Hence, what matters is the “compression” and not the lack 
of heterogeneity.  
                                                 
12 The formula for this CDF is G(x) = H(x/B) where B is the upper support and H is defined on the interval 
[0,1]  as H(x) = (F(x)-F(0))/(F(1)-F(0)), with F(x) = 1/(2*π)*(arctan(σl*(x-1/2)) + arctan(σ2*(x-1))). This   12
 
 
Before turning to the results, we note one other observation regarding the original 
Thomas calibration.  As reported in the fourth column of Table 4, total expenditure due to 
adjustment costs is roughly 1/5 of one percent of total investment spending.  This cost 
seems small on an anecdotal basis, if we think of the costs of the planning, budgeting, 
and committee work that accompany most investments. There are also obvious cases 
when adjustment costs are much larger: think of the re-tooling of a factory, or the 
temporary closure of a retail store to redesign it.  
 
One recent study that computes adjustment costs is by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). 
They study a host of specifications that include convex and non-convex adjustment costs, 
including fixed costs, quadratic costs, gaps between the buying and selling price of 
capital, and productivity distortions created by capital adjustment. Using U.S. plant level 
data, they find statistically significant costs of each type, either when estimated in 
isolation or when several costs are simultaneously present. The total implied adjustment 
costs in this model and all the others (e.g. the one including just fixed costs) are 
substantial.  For instance, their preferred estimates suggest that profits are reduced 20 
percent during investment spikes.  They simulate the model and find that on average 
spending on adjustment costs is equal to 0.91 percent of capital.  Given that investment 
for their sample is about 12.2 percent of capital, this implies that adjustment costs 
average roughly 7.5 percent of investment; in other words, they find adjustment costs 
roughly 40 times the size assumed by Thomas. Abel and Eberly (2002) in their study of 
listed firms find a similar magnitude of adjustment costs (between 1.1 and 9.7 percent of 
investment).  So in what follows we also explore the predicted variation in total 
adjustment costs paid relative to investment.  From a theoretical standpoint, it is hardly 
surprising that lumpiness is quantitatively irrelevant when fixed costs are small. This is 
another motivation to explore the effect of varying B, the parameter which governs the 
level of fixed costs. 
 
Our first experiment is to substitute the compressed distribution of fixed costs from 
Figure 6 for the uniform distribution.  If we keep Thomas choice of B=0.002, then plants 
adjust continuously
13; hence to obtain some lumpiness, we set B=0.008.  The results are 
shown in row 4 of Table 4.  With these changes the extensive margin in the model rises 
to 92.6 percent and the variance of Itot/K due to I20/K rises to 99.9 percent.  Thus, the 
model becomes much closer to the data on these two critical dimensions.  The only 
shortcoming is that expenditure on adjustment costs remains less than one percent of total 
investment spending.   
 
To see that the improvement in fit comes solely from the compression, the next row in 
the table shows the findings when the uniform distribution is used and B is set to 0.0053.  
                                                                                                                                                 
distribution implies that many firms draw either a cost around B/2 or a cost close to B. The parameters 
sigma1 and sigma2 govern how concentrated around B/2 and B the fixed costs are. For all the experiments 
in Table 3 we set σl =150 and σ2=33.3.  
13 This is because the chance of getting a very low fixed cost is low, so that in contrast to Thomas, there is 
no option value of waiting for a low fixed cost.   13
With this level of B the average adjustment costs faced by firms is the same as in row 4.  
With this specification ShareADJ20 drops back towards the level in the baseline Thomas 
specification.  The contrast between rows 4 and 5 quantifies the intuition given above 
about the importance of compression.   
 
Our next step is to increase B to move the expenditure in adjustment costs to a more 
plausible level.  Row 6 shows the result when B is equal to 0.03.  This change increases 
the resources spent on adjustment so that they are nearly two percent of investment.   
Notice that the number of vintages also rises so that J=24.   This occurs because as the 
costs become higher, firms tolerate larger deviations from their target capital before 
adjusting.  Indeed, if we double B again, to B=0.06, then J=45 and the expenditure on 
adjustment costs rises to just over three percent of investment.  In this case, roughly 96 
percent of the plants do not invest.    
 
To limit this waiting it is necessary to give firms higher benefits from adjusting their 
capital stock; to do so we change the curvature of the profit function (which in this model 
comes from the decreasing returns to scale but could also have been introduced by 
assuming monopolistic competition in the product market). The curvature determines the 
cost to having the capital stock deviate from its static optimal level. Subsequent to 
Thomas’ paper a large empirical literature has estimated this curvature to be between 0.5 
and 0.7, markedly lower than one (see e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005), Fuentes, 
Gilchrist and Rysman (2006), and Hennessy and Whited (2005)).  Thus, there are both 
empirical and theoretical reasons to consider calibrations with more curvature.   
 
Comparing rows 6 and 7 shows the effect of changing curvature.  Here we set the return 
to scales to 0.6, and find that relative to row 6 this doubles the resources spent on 
adjustment costs, and reduces the maximum vintage J, so that firms adjust faster.  The 
extensive margin remains dominant.  
 
This suggests that a calibration that raises B and involves more curvature could lead to a 
model that has both non-trivial spending on adjustment and important extensive 
adjustment.  Our preferred calibration confirms this hunch. For these results we increase 
B to 0.06 and keep the returns to scale equal to 0.6; the full set of parameters we choose 
are shown in the last column of Table 3 and the resulting moments are shown in row 8 of 
Table 4.  We now find that the extensive margin is critical and that spending on 
adjustment costs is substantial.   
 
This calibration is not fully optimized, i.e. it is likely that by changing more of the 
baseline parameters we can match the moments more closely. But, we believe that further 
improvements would not change our main conclusions that compression in the 
distribution of fixed costs is key to matching the dominant role of the extensive margin, 
and a combination of high fixed costs and curvature leads to non-trivial spending on 
adjustment costs. 
 
 One defect of our preferred specification is that nearly all the investment is spikes.  This 
comes because we have no maintenance motives for investing.  Row 9 adds a   14
maintenance motive to our calibration. Maintenance is modeled as follows. At the 
beginning of the period, a fraction of plants is hit by a “breakdown shock” which 
decreases its capital stock. The plants that suffer these breakdowns must invest 
immediately 8% of their capital to compensate for the capital destruction. This 
investment is not subject to the fixed cost.  Once the breakdown has (or not) occurred, the 
usual sequence of events takes place, with each plant drawing a fixed cost and then 
deciding to adjust or to wait. We chose the fraction of firms to be 30%. Clearly, adding 
these breakdowns improves our ability to match the cross-sectional distribution of 
investment rates, by generating small investments. Hence spikes now make up only 77% 
of total investment. Most importantly, introducing these breakdowns does not affect our 





Other Distributions of Fixed Costs 
 
Given the central role played by the CDF of fixed costs, it is important to check that the 
feature of our distribution that is driving our results is indeed the “compression”. For this 
purpose, we consider two other distributions, which are displayed in Figure 7.  The 
distribution in the top panel has much more variance than the one we use in our preferred 
calibration, since about 50% of firms draw a fixed cost that is roughly uniformly 
distributed between 0.03 and 0.06 (i.e. the cumulative distribution function is linear in 
this interval).  Thus, studying this distribution allows us to check whether compression 
rather than lack of heterogeneity is important.   
 
The distribution from the bottom panel has only one point of compression rather than two 
as in our preferred calibration.
15  With this distribution virtually all firms draw B, in 
which case the model is closer to the first generation of Ss models
16 rather than the ones 
studied by Caballero and Engel (1999) and Thomas (2002).  Therefore, this distribution 
exhibits compression with even less heterogeneity than our baseline CDF.   
 
As rows 10 and 11 illustrate, the extensive margin remains dominant when either of these 
distributions for fixed costs is substituted for our benchmark distribution.  Based on other 
cases we considered we are convinced that compression is a necessary ingredient for 
                                                 
14 This is not surprising.  Consider an exogenous breakdown process which requires firms to have small 
investment rates; this will create some small investment rates in every period, but since this “maintenance 
investment” will not change over the business cycle it will have almost no effect on aggregate dynamics. 
Indeed, if there are types of investment for which the fixed cost does not apply or is different, calibrating 
the model to match the cross-sectional distribution of investment rates is not informative about the business 
cycle behavior. These considerations are why we concentrate on matching the (capital-weighted) business 
cycle statistics of the cross-section (rather than the average properties).   
15 The formulas for the CDF of the top panel of Figure 8 is G(x) = H(x / B), with H(x) = (F(x)-F(0))/(F(1)-
F(0)), and F(x) = 1/π*(1/4*arctan(σl*(x-1/2)) + ¾*arctan(σ2*(x-1))), and σl =30 and σ2=5. The formula for 
the CDF of the bottom panel of Figure 8 is G(x) = H(x / B), with H(x) = (F(x)-F(0))/(F(1)-F(0)), and F(x) = 
1/(2*π)*(arctan(σl*(x-.95)) + arctan(σ2*(x-1))), and σl =80 and σ2=10. 
 
16 Sheshinksi and Weiss (1977) and (1983), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caplin and Leahy (1991).   15
delivering substantial extensive adjustment, but the exact nature of the compression is not 
critical.
17  In particular, the only heterogeneity in this set up comes from the differences 
in fixed costs, and therefore we believe the results in row 10 are especially important 
because they show that allowing for not trivial heterogeneity does not necessarily 
overturn the basic intuition about the importance of compression.   
 
Relation to the Literature  
 
While these findings are robust to the changes that we have investigated, the literature on 
this class of models is growing quickly and suggests several additional experiments that 
merit consideration.  Khan and Thomas (2006) extend the Thomas (2002) model to allow 
for idiosyncratic productivity shocks.  They do not find any significant effect of fixed 
costs on aggregate dynamics. Their baseline calibration has relatively low adjustment 
costs and only modest curvature.  Moreover, they maintain the assumption of a uniform 
distribution of fixed costs. Given this, and that the productivity shocks are log-normally 
distributed, the marginally inactive firms will not be similar to the marginally active ones. 
They also concentrate on the response of investment to TFP shocks (and not other 
shocks), and on whether the model generates nonlinearities. We concentrate on the 
simpler question of whether aggregate dynamics are different in the fixed cost model and 
in the RBC model. Interestingly, Khan and Thomas emphasize that general equilibrium 
feedbacks affects plant-level investment dynamics, which would imply that the panel data 
estimates from partial equilibrium models that we use may be misleading.  
 
We conjecture that our results would hold if the idiosyncratic productivity shocks do not 
eliminate the compression associated with our parameterization of the fixed costs, but 
would go away if they did. The shape of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks would 
likely matter as well, and we conjecture that a compressed distribution for idiosyncratic 
shocks could also generate results close to ours.  For instance, if the distribution of 
idiosyncratic shocks was degenerate with only a few very different values, then one could 
have firms with different and extremely volatile histories, but at any given time the 
relevant cross-sectional distribution could still be compressed.  
 
Bachmann, Caballero and Engel (2006) also explore issues that we do not consider. Like 
us, their model presumes higher curvature, and higher fixed costs to reproduce “sectoral 
level” volatility. They then calibrate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption to match aggregate volatility. With these features, they obtain like us 
differences between the impulse responses of their model and the RBC model.  They 
emphasize that their specification also implies that the elasticity of aggregate investment 
with respect to a TFP shock is time-varying. This feature is absent from our model 
because it is log-linear. There are two main differences between our paper and theirs. 
First, we keep the same preferences as Thomas (2002), i.e. log utility of consumption and 
linear disutility of leisure (as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)). Since the dispute is 
about whether general equilibrium offsets are central to this debate, we believe this is the 
appropriate place to start. Second, we focus on the shape of the distribution of fixed costs 
                                                 
   16
while they emphasize the role of sectors.
18  If we follow Bachmann et al. and allow for 
preferences with higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution (than the log case) we find 
also more smoothing than in our baseline.   
 
4. Aggregate Dynamics and the Irrelevance Result 
 
We conclude our analysis by revisiting the Thomas (2002) “irrelevance result” using our 
new calibration of the fixed cost model. 
 
4.1. The Thomas result 
 
Thomas compared the effect that aggregate productivity shocks have on investment when 
the fixed cost is positive and when the fixed cost is zero. In the latter case, the model 
simplifies to the standard RBC model (with decreasing returns to scale) without any 
adjustment cost.  The bottom panel of Figure 8 plots the impulse response of the two 
models to the productivity shock.
19 The striking result is that the two models are virtually 
indistinguishable, with the two lines sitting on top of each other. The response on impact 
of the fixed cost model is about 99.8 percent of the response of the RBC model. 
 
This result holds for many variations of parameter values.  For instance, changing the 
elasticity of labor supply or the source of shocks does not affect the result.  Increasing the 
level of fixed costs (B), while maintaining a uniform distribution, also makes little 
difference: for instance, when B is multiplied by a factor of 10, i.e. B = 0.02, so that the 
maximum vintage is J=20, the impact response of the fixed cost model is 98 percent of 
the response of the RBC model. That is, larger fixed costs lead to a slightly smaller 
response of investment, but the difference between the two models remains negligible. 
 
This is in stark contrast with the partial equilibrium analysis, where fixed cost models 
typically generate two features in the impulse response: first, aggregate investment 
becomes of course smoother than without any adjustment costs; second, investment 
becomes subject to oscillatory dynamics (aka “echo effects”, or replacement cycle). 
Thomas argued that the general equilibrium nature of the model was responsible for the 
inconsequential impact of the micro lumpiness. 
 
While there is little doubt that general equilibrium effects are important, there is still a 
tension between the preference for smooth consumption of households and the lumpy 
investment demand of firms. We see no good theoretical reason why all the effects of 
fixed costs would disappear in general equilibrium. Intuitively, this has to be a 
quantitative question: depending on the curvature of the utility function and the 
parameters that govern the investment demand of firms, the race between consumption 
                                                 
18 Another recent paper on the topic is Svenn and Weinke (2005). In contrast to Thomas (2002) or 
Caballero and Engel (1999), they use a Calvo-style time-dependent adjustment rule for capital. 
Interestingly, they find that given this rule, the irrelevance result holds in the RBC model but not in a New 
Keynesian model. 
19 In a one-shock linear model, the impulse response function (IRF) summarizes the full dynamics of the 
system. Hence, models which have the same IRF have exactly the same dynamics in all respects.   17
smoothing and investment lumpiness will go one way or the other. Consistent with this 
intuition, we show below that general equilibrium is not the whole story. Depending on 
microeconomic assumptions, features typical of the partial equilibrium responses with 
fixed costs may still arise in general equilibrium. 
 
4.2 Impulse response to a technology shock with our calibration 
 
We start by displaying in the top panel of Figure 8 the impulse response function of 
aggregate investment to a productivity shock for our preferred calibration from Section 3, 
along with the RBC model with the same parameters but zero fixed costs. While the 
general shape of the impulse response is the same, the two models differ qualitatively in 
two respects.  First, the response is initially smaller in the fixed cost model: on impact the 
response of the fixed cost model is only 89 percent of the response of the RBC model. 
This reflects simply that investment becomes smoother in the presence of adjustment 
costs. Second and more interestingly, the fixed cost model exhibits a noticeable hump 12 
periods after the shock. We call this hump an “echo effect” because it is caused by the 
initial surge in investment: as many firms adjust initially, the distribution shifts toward 
more recent vintages, which are less likely to invest. This makes the investment response 
smaller than the RBC model for a while, until the units which invested at time 0 need to 
invest again to replace their capital. Clearly, this result depends on the shape on the 
hazard rate (the probability of adjusting as a function of vintage, i.e. alpha). For our 
calibration, the hazard rate is initially steeply convex: the alphas (probability of 
adjustment) are very small for the first vintages before rising noticeably after 12 periods. 
(Of course, adjustment is random, and probabilities of adjustment move over time, but 
the average shape of the hazard rate still plays an important role.)  The quantitative 
differences between the responses of the two models to a TFP shock are modest.
20 
 
4.3 The dynamic effects of a change in the cross-sectional distribution with our 
calibration 
 
When we consider disturbances which affect more directly the shape of the cross-
sectional distribution, the differences between the two models become much larger. In 
general the cross-sectional distribution is endogenous to shocks, but there are several 
cases when we might expect it to shift abruptly for exogenous reasons: for instance, 
Bloom (2006) considers the effect of a rise in uncertainty which leads many firms to 
delay capital adjustment.  Another trigger could be an investment tax cut.  In Appendix 3, 
we simulate the effects of an unexpected, temporary cut in the price of capital, such as an 
investment tax credit. That experiment is somewhat complicated to analyze, because not 
only must one specify the size and duration of the change, but one must also account for 
the fact that the tax change changes the level of capital by different amounts in the fixed 
cost model and the RBC model (since they are not equivalent any more).  
 
                                                 
20 With different parameter values (e.g. higher fixed costs, higher depreciation rate, or lower returns to 
scale), the two qualitative differences (smoothing and echo) between the RBC model and fixed cost model 
can be made somewhat larger.    18
To side-step these complications, we consider the following thought experiment: assume 
that many firms have invested in the past two years, so that the distribution is distorted 
with more firms in the first two vintages and fewer firms in all the other vintages. Does 
changing the initial cross-sectional distribution in this way affect aggregate investment?  
This experiment is at the heart of the debate in the fixed cost literature. Figure 9 presents 
the exact perturbations that we consider and Figure 10 gives the aggregate investment 
responses. The RBC model displays the usual, monotonic, smooth convergence to the 
steady-state given a high starting initial capital (since many firms have invested recently). 
The fixed cost model, for our calibration, differs in two respects from the RBC model: 
first, the response of investment is smaller than in the case of the RBC model (except in 
the first two periods). This is because many firms have invested recently, so that there is 
less investment demand as fewer firms are close to the point where they want to invest.  
Second, we obtain a magnified “echo effect” when firms which had invested recently 
finally re-invest after 8 to 11 periods. These features are typical of partial equilibrium 
fixed cost models.  
 
These features arise largely because of our choice of fixed cost distribution: this 
distribution G implies that the hazard rate is initially very low and then rises steeply; the 
initially lower response of aggregate investment stems directly from the first feature, and 
the echo stems from the second feature. In other words, the compression of the CDF that 
is necessary for amplifying the importance of extensive adjustment essentially guarantees 
that the change in the initial cross-sectional distribution will matter for the subsequent 
aggregate dynamics. Overall, we conclude that a shock which affects the shape of the 
cross-sectional distribution has very different effects when fixed costs are positive than 
when they are nil.
21  
 
We emphasize that all of these results are obtained with log utility. As a point of 
reference the bottom panel of Figure 10 shows the same experiment in the baseline 
Thomas model. The RBC model and the Thomas model yield essentially identical 
predictions even for this experiment. This equivalence for us is proof that general 
equilibrium effects are not the only reason why Thomas found no aggregate effect of 
fixed costs. Depending on microeconomic assumptions, i.e. on the calibration, the 





We make three contributions to the debate over the aggregate significance of plant-level 
investment lumpiness.  Remarkably, the basic plant-level facts on the lumpiness of 
investment are fairly similar in Chile and the  U . S .   I n  e a c h  c o u n t r y ,  w e  s h o w  t h a t  
investment spikes drive total investment.  The spikes draw their predictive power from 
changes in number of plants making large investments, rather than changes in the size of 
average investment per plant.  We use these statistics regarding the decomposition 
                                                 
21 To keep our experiment simple, we picked the initial cross-sectional distribution arbitrarily, but similar 
results are obtained when one runs a true investment tax credit in the model.   19
between the intensive and extensive margins of adjustment to summarize the 
microeconomic facts about lumpiness that we ask a model to match. 
 
We use the Thomas (2002) model to examine these facts.  This model augments a 
relatively standard RBC model by assuming that firms must pay a fixed cost (that is 
randomly drawn each period) in order to adjust its capital.  As originally calibrated, 
however, the model fails to generate a dominant role of investment spikes and a dominant 
role of the extensive margin.   To fit these facts we change the distribution of fixed costs 
from which firms sample and make it more “compressed” than the distribution 
considered by Thomas.  We also argue that the original calibration has an average level 
of fixed costs which is too low and a profit function that has too little curvature. 
 
Our final contribution is to study the properties of the model using our preferred 
calibration.  In the original Thomas model the aggregate dynamics for investment 
following a productivity shock were indistinguishable from an RBC model with no 
adjustment costs.  In our model this type of shock plays out somewhat differently. 
Moreover, for shocks that directly reshape the cross-sectional distribution of capital, the 
two models have very different implications: in general, the fixed cost model predicts that 
investment is more depressed for a while; moreover, the fixed cost model generates an 
echo effect which is absent in the RBC model.  
 
Our conclusion from the last exercise is that there is nothing generically related to DSGE 
models that guarantees that plant-level investment lumpiness is smoothed away. Rather 
we agree with Thomas that there can be substantial differences between the importance 
of lumpiness in a GE models and partial equilibrium models. However, many have gone 
farther and concluded that GE makes fixed costs to investment completely irrelevant for 
the business cycle. Both our empirical and theoretical work shows this conclusion is 
premature; in particular, the details of how the production side is modeled matter. Given 
the currently available information our calibration is reasonable, but we recognize much 
more work needs to be done in this respect to determine how these models should be 
estimated and calibrated. 
   20
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Appendix 1: Data 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to briefly describe the data that we analyze in section 2. 
 
US Census data: 
 
One of our data sets relates to U.S. establishment-level data between 1972 and 1998. 
These data were kindly provided by Shawn Klimek of the Census Bureau.  The capital 
expenditure data are taken from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures 
(ASM) and the details of the data construction are given in Becker et al (2006).  Their 
core calculation involves building up a capital stock series using a perpetual inventory 
method.   
 
The data provided to us were sorted establishments into different categories according to 
the ratio of investment to beginning of period capital (Ii,t/Ki,t-1).  Totals for investment and  
(beginning of period) capital were computed by summing across all establishments in a 
given category for each year; for example, data for total investment for firms with Ii,t/Ki,t-1 
> 0.2 would be one entry in the spreadsheet that we received.  By summing across 




Our second data set is a plant-level census of manufacturing plants with ten or more 
employees from Chile. These data are collected by the National Statistics Institute of 
Chile and the series we exploit were provided to us by Olga Fuentes and Simon Gilchrist, 
who constructed real capital stocks and real investment series from a perpetual inventory 
equation, with industry-specific investment prices and depreciation rates. The data we use 
is an unbalanced panel which has on average 1780 plants per year, from 1981 to 1999.  
We delete firms with missing observations. We sort firms based on their investment-
capital ratio using the same procedure we use for the Census data. 
 
The spreadsheets with these data are available on the following web page: 
http://people.bu.edu/fgourio/extintpaper.html   24
Appendix 2: Additional Comparative Dynamics and the Extensive-Intensive 
Decomposition 
 
This appendix studies how different parameters affect the extensive-intensive 
decomposition that we emphasize in the paper. The key finding is that some parameters 
have a weak or counter-intuitive effect on this decomposition. Understanding this 
“negative” result seems relevant from a technical point of view, because similar issues 
have arisen in the sticky price literature following the work of Klenow and Kryvstov 
(2005). Our results raise warning flags regarding some intuitive approaches to calibrating 
these models, because these approaches may not be robust. For instance, we show a 
higher fixed cost can increase, not decrease, the importance of the extensive margin over 
the business cycle.  
 
To start, consider first the Thomas model when there are no aggregate shocks. Due to 
depreciation, there is some firm-level variation in investment: firms let their capital 
depreciate, and readjust after a few periods, depending on their draws of fixed costs. The 
model thus generates a cross-sectional distribution of investment rates. We can think of 
the aggregate investment in this economy (which is constant over time) as the product of 
the number of investing firms, times the average investment that each of these firms is 
doing. In this economy, which is the non-stochastic steady-state
22 of the full Thomas 
model, the following intuitive results hold: 
 
-  an increase in the level of fixed costs leads to an increase in the maximum vintage 
J, a reduction in the number of firms investing, and an increase in the average 
amount invested per firm investing; 
 
-  an increase in the curvature of the profit function (i.e. a reduction in returns to 
scale) leads to a decrease in J, an increase in the number of firms investing, and a 
reduction in the average amount invested per firm investing; 
 
-  an increase in the depreciation rate or in the growth rate of the economy reduces J, 
increases the number of firms investing, and reduces the average investment per 
firm investing.  
 
Hence, these parameters all have intuitive effects on the relative importance of the 
extensive and intensive margins: increasing the cost of adjusting the extensive margin 
(the fixed cost) reduces its importance, and increases the importance of the intensive 
margin. 
 
Next consider the business cycle implications when aggregate shocks are added to this 
model. To gain some intuition, suppose that a positive technology shock occurs.  This 
will raise the marginal product of capital and lead firms to want to accumulate more 
capital. As a result, more firms find it worth paying the fixed cost and the number of 
firms “adjusting” rises.  But, a second margin is also important: the capital stock of firms 
                                                 
22 By “nonstochastic” we mean the model without aggregate productivity shocks; we maintain the random 
idiosyncratic shocks to the level of the fixed cost.   25
that do adjust, denoted by k0,t+1, increases too. This means that the typical investment per 
adjuster will increase. Hence the model will generate a mix of extensive and intensive 
margins: both the number of adjusters and the investment per adjuster will typically be 
procyclical.  
 
A natural conjecture is that the results for the nonstochastic steady-state quoted above 
extend to the business cycle extensive-intensive decomposition. That is, one may think 
that higher fixed costs lead not only to a smaller number of firms adjusting on average, 
but also to a smaller importance of the variation over time in the number of firms 
adjusting. The panel A of Table A-1 considers the effect of increasing solely B, starting 
from the Thomas calibration. The main result is that ShareADJ20 actually increases. 
(And so does ShareADJ0, the number of firms which are doing any kind of positive 
investment, not only spikes.) Quantitatively, this effect is not very large: comparing rows 
1 and 6 shows that a ten fold increase in B moves ShareADJ20 by 12 percentage points. 
(Moreover, we found that with other parameter values, this effect was often even 
smaller.) 
 
Our interpretation of these results (related to Klenow and Kryvstov (2005)) is as follows.  
In the low B economy, no matter if you choose to change your adjustment threshold in 
response to a shock, the probability of adjusting in the next two or three years is very 
large. So there is a limited incentive to tie an adjustment to aggregate shock and the 
variation in the amount of investment per adjusting firm is naturally low.   
 
In contrast, when B is high, the maximum vintage rises and most firms will wait many 
periods and undertake larger investments when they do adjust.  In this case, making sure 
that capital is high when productivity is high becomes more important and firms have a 
stronger incentive to invest when there is a favorable aggregate shock.  Thus, in a high B 
environment two opposing forces are operative.  There are more vintages and hence more 
variation in the investment per adjuster, but there also is a stronger incentive to 
synchronize when investments occur, leading to more variation in the number of 
adjusting firms.  Because of these two countervailing effects, varying B has ambiguous 
effects on how a productivity shock will change the extensive/intensive decomposition.     
 
In a number of experiments that we considered besides those reported in Table A-1, these 
two effects seem to roughly cancel, so that the amount of extensive adjustment is little 
affected by varying B.  Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and Klenow and Kryvstov 
(2005) mention similar “counterintuitive” results when discussing the effect of trend 
inflation rate on business cycle dynamics.  Hence, these considerations seem to arise in 
other contexts as well.
23 
 
When we change the benefits to adjusting, by changing either the depreciation rate or the 
curvature of the profit function, we obtain similarly counterintuitive results. Panel B in 
                                                 
23 See Foote (1998) and Campbell and Fisher (2001) for a similar debate on the theoretically unclear effect 
of trend growth on employment dynamics, and Caballero (1992) for a general exposition of the problem. 
These models have a somewhat different microeconomic structure (e.g., linear costs of adjustment and 
idiosyncratic shocks) but appear to be related to our findings.   26
Table A-1 shows that lowering the curvature has mixed effects. Neither the percentage of 
firms adjusting or the extensive margin monotonically responds to this change.   
Moreover, the total effect on ShareADJ20 is modest, even though range of curvature 
parameters in these experiments varies all the way from 0.95 to 0.6.   
 
Panel C shows that raising the depreciation rate lowers the number of firms investing and 
has ambiguous effects on the share of adjusters; notice the non-monotonicity in 
ShareADJ20 in these experiments.  Thus, it seems that even if the changes in the 
incentive to adjust on average are clear, the effect of how firms respond to shocks may 
not be.   
 
In contrast, changing the CDF of fixed costs has strong and reliable effects on both the 
steady-state of the model and the importance of the share of adjusters over the business 
cycle. This was already clear from Table 4. Another interesting experiment is to add a 
small probability of drawing a zero fixed cost. This captures the idea of very large 
idiosyncratic shocks which dwarf the fixed cost, and which lead firms to adjust. As 
expected, firms then tend to wait until they draw this zero fixed cost to adjust. 
Consequently, the share of firms adjusting is almost constant over the business cycle, 
equal to the number of firms drawing this zero fixed cost. 
   27
Appendix 3: An investment tax credit 
 
The four panels of Figure A-1 show the response to an investment tax credit (ITC) in our 
model. The experiment we consider is an unexpected decrease in the price of capital 
goods by 1%, which is financed by lump-sum taxes, and which lasts for two years. The 
first panel shows the response of aggregate investment in the RBC model and in the 
preferred calibration of the cost model in section 3. On impact, the adjustment costs of 
course lead to a more muted response.  The more interesting part is what happens once 
the ITC has ended, i.e. starting in period three. The two year reduction in the cost of 
capital leads many firms to pull forward their investment and thus the distribution of 
plants is distorted.  The second panel of Figure A-1 drops the first two years to highlight 
what happens starting in period 3.  The responses for the two models are not strictly 
comparable since the total investment during the ITC differs so that the total level of 
capital as of period 3 differs.   
 
The third panel rescales the response of the RBC model so that it enters period 3 with the 
same level of capital as the model with our preferred calibration.  With this adjustment, 
investment in the wake of the ITC is now smaller in the fixed cost model and the fixed 
cost model continues to show echo effects. Finally, the fourth panel plots the difference 
between the fixed cost model and the (rescaled) RBC model, multiplied by 10 to 
demonstrate the effect of a 10% ITC. Looking at the last two panels the qualitative 
differences between the RBC and fixed cost models that we saw the ad-hoc experiment in 
section 4.3 are preserved in this ITC experiment, though they are smaller.  
 
The four panels of Figure A-2 give the same analysis for the Thomas calibration. 
Importantly, the key third panel shows no difference between the RBC model and the 
fixed cost model. Consequently, the comparison of the fourth panels of Figures A-1 and 
A-2 respectively quantifies the importance of our calibration for this ITC experiment. In 
the Thomas calibration, the difference between the two models is extremely small (less 
than 0.15%, on impact), while for our calibration it is substantial (more than 2% on 
impact). 
 
We also considered ITCs which were anticipated, and found similar effects.   28





















I/K=0 15.8  3.4  41.31  18.55 
0<I/K<2 15.1  12.1  11.04  17.24 
2≤I/K<8 29.7  33.3  17.78  26.32 
8≤I/K<12 11.5  14.4  6.76  9.44 
12≤I/K<20 11.6  16  8.44  11.84 
20≤I/K<35 8  10.8  7.36  8.83 
35≤I/K 8.3  10  7.31  7.78 
   29
Table 2:  Forecasting of Aggregate Investment by Share of Plants undergoing Investment 
Spikes. 
 
Dependent variable is Itott/Kt-1 , the ratio of the sum of investment across all plants to the sum of beginning 
of period capital across all plants; the lag of this variable is denoted Itott-1/Kt-2,  Rows of the table show 
regressions with different right hand side variables.  Salest-1/Kt-2  is the (lag of) total plant-level shipments 
divided by the (lag of) the total capital at all establishments.  A time trend is always included (but not 
shown).  ADJ20 is defined below the table. For the U.S. sample, the time period is 1974 to 1998.  For the 
Chilean sample the time period is 1981 to 1999.  The standard errors are computing using the Newey-West 
(1987) correction with three lags. 
 
     Coefficient  estimates 
(standard errors) 
Row Sample  2 R
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Table 3: Parameters in the Thomas (2002) Calibration and in our Preferred Calibration. 
 
Parameter   Thomas (2002)  Preferred Calibration 
Depreciation rate (δ)   0.06  0.06 
Persistence of TFP shock (ρ) 0.9225  0.9225 
Returns to scale (ψ υ + )  0.905 0.60 
Share of capital in Production Function ψ   0.325 0.2155 
Share of capital in Output ψ /ψ υ +   0.359 0.359 
B (maximum fixed cost)  0.002  0.06 
Discount factor (β) 0.954  0.954 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution   1  1 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply  Infinite  Infinite 
 
In our preferred calibration, the CDF for G is G(x) = H(x / B) where B is the upper 
support and H is defined on the interval [0,1]  as H(x) = (F(x)-F(0))/(F(1)-F(0)), with  
F(x) = 1/(2*π)*(arctan(σl*(x-1/2)) + arctan(σ2*(x-1))). We set σl =150 and σ2=33.3.   31
Table 4: Steady-State and Business Cycle Lumpiness Statistics for various calibrations. 
 
 
Row   J  Total Adjustment 
Costs / Total I  % 
Mean %  Plants 
I/K>0.20 
Mean I20/Itot  % Variance 
of  Itot/K due to 
I20/K 
Share ADJ 20 
1  Data US  NA  NA  20.8 49.9 97.0  87.0 
2  Data Chile  NA  NA  16.6 57.3 86.0  92.5 
3  Thomas (2002) 
Calibration 
5  0.21  19.7 85.9 62.4  51.7 
4  Thomas with 
Compressed CDF 
and B=0.008 
11  0.87  12.2 99.9 99.9  92.6 
5 
 
Thomas with Uniform 
CDF and B=0.0053 
(i.e. same mean as row 4) 
9  0.34  17.1 93.9 81.9  55.2 
6  Thomas with 
Compressed CDF and 
Higher B (B=0.03) 
 
24  1.97 6.4  99.9  99.9 100.0 
7  Thomas with 
Compressed CDF and 
Lower return to scales 
(0.6), and Higher B=0.03 
16  3.97 8.3  99.9  99.9 115.6 
8  Preferred Calibration 
 = Thomas with 
Compressed CDF and 
Lower return to scales 
and higher B=0.06  
23 
 
6.24 5.9  99.9  99.9 84.5 
9  Preferred Calibration 
with Breakdowns 
23 5.58  5.9  77.4  100.1  86.0 
10  CDF with more variance  22  5.27 9.7  99.7  99.5 81.2 
11  CDF with only one spike  16  7.41 7.8  99.9  99.9 75.8 
 
Notes:  Results from simulations of the model (500 simulations of 200 periods each). See 
the text for the full characteristics of the alternative calibrations.  The definitions of I20, 
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The %Variance of  Itot/K due to I20/K is Cov(I20/K, Itot/K)/Var(Itot/K), and the 
ShareADJ20 is Cov(log(K20/K),log(I20/K))/Var(log(I20/K)) where the logs of the 
various series are de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with a smoothing 
parameter equal to 100 since these are annual simulations).   32
Table A-1: Additional Comparative Dynamics in the Thomas Model.  
 
Row   J  Mean % of 
Plants with 
I/K=0  




Share ADJ 20 
 
Panel A: Effect of Changing B (the maximum value of fixed costs) in the Thomas calibration 
 
1 B=0.002  (Thomas)  5 72.7 19.7  66.1  51.8 
2 B=0.004  8 77.6 18.0  68.2  53.9 
3 B=0.005  9 79.1 17.3  68.8  54.7 
4 B=0.008  11 81.9  15.7  70.3 58.0 
5 B=0.01  13 83.1  14.9  71.3 59.6 
6 B=0.02  20 86.4  12.5  74.0 64.1 
 
Panel B: Effect of Changing returns to scale  in the Thomas calibration 
 
7  Scale = 0.95   7 76.6 18.5  67.9  53.4 
8  Scale = 0.905 
(Thomas) 
5 72.7 19.7  66.3  51.6 
9  Scale = 0.8  4 69.0 20.0  64.7  54.6 
10  Scale = 0.6  4 68.0 20.0  65.8  59.3 
 
Panel C: Effect of changing the depreciation rate in the Thomas calibration 
 
11  Delta = 0.04  7 76.8 13.6  67.4  66.7 
12  Delta = 0.06 
(Thomas) 
 
5 72.7 19.7  65.5  51.5 
13  Delta = 0.08  4 68.6 28.2  64.9  54.4 
14  Delta = 0.10  3 64.8 30.3  61.5  47.0 
Notes: Results from simulations of the model (500 simulations of 200 periods each). The 
parameters are as in Thomas (2002), i.e. the first column of Table 3, except for one 
different parameter in each row. Share ADJ0 is defined as 
Cov(log(K0/K),log(I/K))/Var(log(I/K)) where K0 is the total of capital of plants doing a 
positive investment. Share ADJ20 is Cov(log(K20/K),log(I20/K)/Var(log(I20/K)). All 
series in logs are HP filtered (with a smoothing parameter equal to 100 since these are 
annual simulations).   33
 Figure 1: Investment Lumpiness in U.S. Manufacturing Plants 
 























































































































Left Panels:  “Near Zeros” are defined as plants with 0 ≤ I/K < 0.02 and are shown in the 
solid line.  Plants with I/K = 0 are shown with dashed line.   
Right panels: Solid line is plants with I/K > 0.2.   Dashed line is I/K  > 0.35.   
Top-panel is in number of plants, and bottom-panel is capital-weighted. 
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Left Panels:  “Near Zeros” are defined as plants with 0 ≤ I/K < 0.02 and are shown in the 
solid line.  Plants with I/K =0 are shown with dashed line.   
 
Right panels: Solid line is plants with I/K > 0.2.   Dashed line is I/K  > 0.35.   
Top-panel is in number of plants, and bottom-panel is capital-weighted.   35
Figure 3:  Cyclicality of Near Zero Investment and Investment Spikes in U.S. and 
Chilean Manufacturing Plants 








































≡≡ ∑∑ , Near zeros is the capital-weighted share of plants 
with near-zero investment and spikes is the capital-weighted share of plants with a spike.   
Each series shown in the figure are residuals from a regression that remove a linear time 
trend.   
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Figure 4:  Decomposition of Aggregate Investment for U.S. and Chilean Manufacturing 
Plant into Investment Spikes and Remaining Investment.  
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Figure 5:  Decomposition of de-trended Aggregate Investment into Intensive and 
Extensive Adjustment for U.S. and Chilean Manufacturing Plants. 


























Notes: ADJ20, IPA20 and I20/K are defined in the text. Each series shown in the figure 
are residuals from a regression that removes a linear time trend.   38
Figure 6: Cumulative Distribution Function G of Fixed Costs used in Our Calibration. 
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Figure 7: Cumulative Distribution Function G of Fixed Costs used as robustness checks. 
























Figure 8:  Impulse Response of Aggregate Investment to an Aggregate Productivity 
Shock for our Preferred Calibration of the DSGE Model with Fixed Costs (Top Panel) 
and for the Original Thomas Calibration (Bottom Panel). 







































RBC with no adjustment costs
 
 











































RBC with no adjustment costs
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Figure 9:  Initial Cross-Sectional Distribution for the experiment of Section 4.3 in our 
Preferred Calibration (Top Panel) and in the Thomas Calibration. 












































Notes:  In both cases the first two vintages are up by 20% each and the other vintages are 
reduced equally.   42
Figure 10:  Dynamic Path for Aggregate Investment When the Initial Distribution of 
Capital is Distorted in the Our Calibration of the DSGE Model with Fixed Costs (Top 
Panel) and in the Thomas Calibration (Bottom Panel). 










































RBC with no adjustment costs







































RBC with no adjustment costs
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Figure A-1: Comparison of  an ITC for our Preferred Calibration and the RBC model 
Panel 1:  Impulse Response to an unexpected 1% ITC lasting two years  
       











































RBC with no adjustment costs
 
Panel 2: Impulse Response to an unexpected 1% ITC lasting two years, period 3 onward 







dynamics from XS distribution induced by an ITC
Preferred DSGE Calibration
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dynamics from XS distribution induced by an ITC
Preferred DSGE Calibration
RBC with no adjustment costs
 
Panel 4: Difference between the responses in panel 3 for a 10 percent ITC 
 
 









dynamics from XS distribution induced by an ITC: x10
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Figure A-2 Comparison of an ITC for the Thomas (2002) model and the RBC model 
Panel 1:  Impulse Response to an unexpected 1% ITC lasting two years  
 











































RBC with no adjustment costs
 
Panel 2: Impulse Response to an unexpected 1% ITC lasting two years, period 3 onward 





dynamics from XS distribution induced by an ITC
Thomas (2002) Calibration
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Panel 3: Panel 2 rescaled so that both models begin period 3 with identical levels of 
capital 
 









dynamics from XS distribution induced by an ITC
Thomas (2002) Calibration
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Panel 4: Difference between the responses in panel 3 for a 10 percent ITC 
 







dynamics from XS distribution induced by an ITC: x10
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